The emergence of elements of the free market in the neo-Babylonian period

Andrew Brown
ch. 6

This week’s reading gives us a glimpse of Babylonia in the Impirial Era that is characterized by widespread mercantilism. The emergence of large industries, often supported by middlemen, allowed the formation of, perhaps, the first system in which members of society could accumulate wealth without any means of production of their own.
Such is the case of Iddin-Marduk, who facilitated the marketing of his local town’s produce in Babylon. Basically, Iddin-Marduk bought produce from farmers and then, in turn, sold the goods at the Babylonian market, assumingly, for a profit. This story is so remarkable because it represents an organic emergence of capitalistic market qualities. This story also begs the question of how Iddin-Marduk got enough capital to purchase the grain and dates that he sold. His ability to accumulate enough capital to become a secondary retailer testifies to the existence of a highly productive economy. Perhaps if the costs and time associated with transportation of goods were not so great, the agricultural productivity of the states of the Fertile Crescent would have allowed them to extend their influence far beyond the Mediterranean Sea or the Zagros Mountains.
The next point that I thought was interesting was the emergence of the first bankers – womyn. Johannes says that loans were not typically given in neo-Babylonia. However, womyn often loaned out portions of their dowry to receive interest on it. This surprised me because, on the one hand, it represents a degree of financial independence that I did not think women of the 6th century BCE possessed, and, on the other hand, it represents one of the ways in which local markets were increasingly being incorporated into the larger Babylonian economy.
Lastly, we get a very different view of palace dependents in Empires than what Liverani presented in Uruk. From a class of artisans and craftsmen (with somewhat of a heightened social status and who put stress on the “outer ring” of farmers and other necessity-good producers), dependents in the neo-Babylonian era are essentially farmers employed directly or indirectly (in the case of temple-farmers) through the palace. Perhaps by the time of the neo-Babylonian era, palatial and temple officials had figured out that supporting a large workforce of luxury-good manufacturers (as the temple had done in Uruk) was an unsustainable practice that shortened the lifespan of an administrative body. This is one possibility; the other is that these officials decided that they, themselves, would rather be in the position of being supported by the state economy.